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CHAPTER I
· Introduction to the Problem and a Review of Relevant Literature
Previous investigations of the process of clinical assessment have
centered around the validity of the clinicians' instruments as well as
the validity and reliability of the clinicians' own judgmental process
(Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 1965; Gough, 1962; Hathaway, 1955; Little &
Shneidman, 1959; Meehl, 1960).

Inherent in these studies has been the

controversy of actuarial versus clinical prediction (Gough, 1962; Meehl,
1960; Sawyer, 1966; Taft, 1959).

In many of these studies, the performance

of clinicians in judgmental situations has not exactly been a call for
optimism.

Quite demonstrative of this was Little and Shneidman's study in

which they compared individual blind diagnoses of experienced clinicians
from several tests of personality and found that the clinicians agreed only
slightly above chance.

Similarly, Sawyer summarized a number of previous

studies in comparing clinical prediction with mechanical or actuarial
prediction, and found that users of a combination of the two methods seemed
to outperform users of the pure clinical method alone.
Also involved in the controversy over the validity of clinical
judgment is the disconcertion of not a few researchers with clinicians
and particularly psychodiagnosticians of projective tests -- who continue
to report clinical observations and make clinical inferences which, according
to the research evidence, are clearly erroneous.

Chapman and Chapman

(1967, 1969) have pointed out this phenomenon on two projective tests, the
Draw-A-Person (DAP) and the Rorschach, as have Roeback (1968) and Swenson
1
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(1968) more extensively on the DAP.

The disconcertion of the researchers

has ·led Meehl (1960) to conunent,
Personally I find the cultural lag between what the published
research shows and what clinicians persist in claiming to do
with their favorite devices even more disheartening than the
adverse evidence itself. (p. 26)
Advocates of clinical judgment, intuition, or the inferential
process, have

counte~ed

(with some justification) with the claim that the

validity of the research evidence may be brought to question, and that the
comparative techniques of tli.e researchers take clinical inference out of
context and apart from the assessment process.

Moreover, practicing

clinicians maintain that their observations and inferences are substantiated
through consensual validation with the similar observations of other
clinicians.
More recent investigations then have centered around the process of
clinical inference.

These studies have attempted to simulate the cognitive

processes of the clinician as he makes his judgmental decisions.
research takes two related but somewhat different forms.

This

First, those

studies investigating the accumulation of information according to a
linear additive or configural process (Anderson, 1972; Goldberg, 1968),
and secondly, those studies which investigate factors influencing the
clinician's selection and utilization of cues in diagnostic judgment
(Chapman & Chapman, 1967,1969; Hunt & Walker, 1971).

It is this second,

albeit ambiguous, distinction with which this research is concerned, all
the while keeping an eye to the earlier presented argument about the
validity of clinical inference.
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Process of Clinical Inference
Thorne (1961) sees diagnosis as essentially a problem-solving process
with the classic pattern being:

1) data collection, 2) data reduction,

3) identification of pathognomic cues, 4) classification and categorization
coding, 5) etiological diagnosis, 6) pathological diagnosis, 7) differential
diagnosis, 8) nosological diagnosis, and 9) prognostic diagnosis.

Thorne

has noted that of these, data reduction and identification of pathognomic
cues are the two most critical steps, and it is with these two processes
that this research is most concerned.
In the problem-solving step of data reduction, the judge utilizes
both inductive and deductive reasoning.

Inductively, he scans the test

stimulus complex to gather cues and formulate an hypothesis.
having formulated

an

Deductively,

hypotfiesis about the personality of the subject, he

attempts to find cues which verify or discontirm this hypothesis.
In the problem-solving step of identifying the pathognomic cues,
the judge must discriminate between those cues present which are indicative
of a particular personality description and other irrelevant cues which,
though present, are not indicative of that personality description.
Thorne has here made a point highly relevant to the validity problem and to the clinician-versus-researcher controversy.

A tentative

ex~

planation for the lack of validity and reliability in clinical judgment
may be the fact that clinical judges are not able to differentiate valid
cues.

This is, as will later be pointed out, the major theme of the

Chapmans' studies, and it will also lie at the crux of the research
design to be presented.
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Hunt and Jones (1961) also spoke of the identification of appropriate cues under the heading of stimulus identification.

They noted

that the stimulus elements (cues) in a clinical judgment situation are
largely unknown and ill-defined.
glance at the research literature.

This is immediately obvious in a brief
Many of the hypotheses forwarded by

projective test constructors have remained unexplored, and on quite a number
of the hypotheses whi-ch have been researched, there is evidence both
substantiating and disconfirming the importance of a particular sign as a
pathognomic cue.

The clinician' then, in making his judgment, must deal

with global and complex stimulus situations, and he must identify the
specific part stimuli which will provide him with the essential cues for
making a judgment.
Sarbin, Taft, and Bailey (1960) differentiated four stages in the
cognitive activity of a clinician attempting to formulate an inference:
1) scanning, 2) scrutinizing, 3) probing, and 4) soliciting.

Scanning

is defined as an unbiased sweeping of the entire set of cues to detect
cues relevant to the current enterprise.

Scrutinizing involves a more

active search for the relevant cues, while probing and soliciting are
more advanced forms of inferential investigation.

In this instance, the

element of prime concern, again, is with how the judge scans the cue
complex to detect relevant cues.
Gardner (1961) has noted individual differences in this scanning
principle.

He has found the ability to focus on relevant cues and to

not attend to irrelevant cues to be independent.of the cues in the stimulus
complex.

He calls this a "field articulation ability," or the ability to

concentrate on certain cues and to ignore illusion-producing cues.

5

Studies on the factors influencing the selection and utilization
of cues have investigated several variables, among them number of cues
utilized, effects of immediate feedback,
reference of the clinician.

~d

the conceptual frame of

It is to this last problem of clinician bias

and original judgmental frame of reference that Chapman and Chapman (1967,
1969) relate.

In a series of studies on factors influencing

clinic~l

judgment, they have demonstrated how prior expectations of the relationships
between cues and criteria can lead to faulty observation and inference.
Moreover, their results indicate that judges who systematically make
invalid associations of pathognomicity to certain cues derived from projectiv~

protocols, may in fact be reactipg to the prior expectation of

cue (sign) and symptom based on word
and relevant cues pYesent in

t.~e

associatio~,

rather than to the valid

protocol.

Systematic Error in Clinical Report
Examples of systematic error of various kinds have been reported by
psychologists investigating other behavioral phenomena.

Thorndike (1920a)

proposed the halo effect after studying the ratings of officers made by
their superiors in the army.

Thorndike defined his halo effect as a

marked tendency or constant error toward suffusing ratings of specific
features wit.ti a positive quality belonging to the individual as a whole.
Another example, the Muller-Lyer illusion (Krech et al., 1969) occurs
in perceptual phenomena.

The classical Muller-Lyer includes two horizontal

lines of the same length which appear unequal because of the opposite
directions of arrowheads attached to either end.

The Muller-Lyer illusion

is an example of a part being dependent on the nature of a whole.

Such a

part-whole relationship generalizes to problem solving and to stereotyping

6

and is usually associated with the perceptual effects referred to as one's
"frame of reference."

Loevinger (1965) has pointed to the presence of

systematic error running through items of

~ating

scales.

The effect of the

systematic error here is to raise item homogeneity and to thus increase
and inflate the correlation of that test with other tests which have the
.
.
same error. Loevinger noted that this correlation seduces many psychologists
into clinging to a weak item form even when the incurring· weakness of such
an effect is pointed out.
The Chapmans believe that the principles of systematic error can
be generalized regardless of the subject matter involved.
clinical observations are the same as

sup~rstitions,

Thus, errors in

beliefs in magic, and

social prejudice in that all are based on systematic error in the reports
of observations of a supposed correlation between two classes of events.
The Chapmans call this report of a correlation not warranted by the facts
an "illusory correlation."

"Correlation" here is not taken in the

statistical sense, but is taken to mean co-occurrence; that is, an
occurrence of one event tends to imply the occurrence of another.

An

illusory correlation may include both systematic and random error, and
can occur under one or more of three conditions:

1) when two classes of

events are not correlated, 2) when two classes of events are correlated
to a lesser extend than reported, and 3) when two classes of events are
correlated in the opposite direction of that reported.
As applied to clinical judgment, illusory correlation includes
erroneous reports of correlations between symptoms of patients and their
performance on diagnostic tests.

This is particularly apparent when

7

performance on these tests is interpreted in terms of signs which can be
derived from the stimulus complex of test responses.

For example, on

the DAP, "eye" or "elaboration of the eye•: appears to have some unmeasured
relationship of a cognitive or semantic nature -- and thus some associative
value -- to "paranoia."
Loren Chapman (1967) noted the presence of reported illusory
correlations between pairs of words which have associative properties and
properties of distinctiveness.

Two words may have associative properties

when they are similar in meaning and associatively related.

For example,

"table" and "chair" have a high associative value because of their frequent
occurrence with each other, as do "flag". and "banner" which are similar
in meaning.

Properties of distinctiveness are those properties which

e<lsily di..ffE'ri:!:r>tiate

2.

\<?ord pair from other words of a list.

An cxwr.plc

would be a pair of three syllable words among pairs of one syllable words.
Chapman and Chapman (1967) generalized this systematic error to
the clinical situation with six studies on the DAP.
strategies were

~o

The purposes of their

determine the extent of illusory correlation in clinical

observation, to investigate the bases of these errors, and to investigate
the conditions under which these errors occur.
In order to test their hypothesis of illusory correlation in a
quasi-clinical situation, the Chapmans needed to use a test and a symptom
for which both valid and invalid signs have been reported by clinical
researchers.

They noted the controversy over sign interpretations of the

DAP and selected that projective test.

Thus, they set out to prove that

the popular meanings being reported by clinicians were illusory correlations
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based on verbal associative connection of the test sign to the symptom,
rather than on the clinicians' valid observations.
First of all, they needed to

kno~

how clinicians used the DAP.

Therefore, they sent a survey to 110 practicing psychodiagnosticians to
learn the characteristics of the drawings that the diagnosticians reported
that they had observed.
ments:

Their survey took the form of six symptom state-

1) he is worried about how manly he is; 2) he is suspicious of

other people; 3) he is worried about how intelligent he is; 4) he is
concerned with being fed and taken care of by other people; 5) he has had
problems of sexual impotence; 6) he is worried that people are saying bad
things about him.

For each of these six symptom statements, the

diagnosticians were asked to assume that the patient was a man and to
list what the drawings of each would be characterized by.

With this data

they were able to compare reports made by clinicians with similar observations made by undergraduate observers performing the role of "beginning
clinicians" in a quasi-clinical situation.
In their first study of this strategy, the Chapmans presented
to undergraduate observers a series of DAP drawings, each of which was
paired with two contrived symptoms of the alleged patient who drew it.
By looking through the drawings (for a brief period of 30 seconds each)
the observers were supposedly accumulating "clinical experience" as to
the meaning of different aspects of performance on the DAP.

The drawings

and symptom statements were paired in such a way that there was no
relationship between the occurrence of any symptom and any drawing
characteristic (sign) viewed as its correlate in conventional clinical

9

practice.

The drawings which were used were obtained from 35 di.agnosed

psychotics and ten

gradua~e

students.

Two of the six symptom statements.given above appeared paired
together on each card.

Each of the six symptom statements was paired with

every other statement in the set, thus making 15 possible pairs.
of 45 different cards was used.

A set

Thus, each symptom statement was paired

with every other symptom statement three times in the set of 45 cards, and
each pairing appeared on a different card.
The hypot:hesis to be tested was that naive observers would
"rediscover" the same widely accepted correlates of. the six symptoms that
clinicians erroneously use.

The alternate hypothesis to follow was that

if naive observers report the same correlates, shared systematic errors
must be inferred.

Moreover, if these were the same correlates that

clinicians used, one might suspect that clinicians would show these same
systematic errors.
After viewing the pictures, the subjects were asked to list the
characteristics of each picture for each of the six symptom statements.
The results (partially given in Table 3) indicated that the observers
showed massive illusory correlation and, that the illusory correlations that
they reported showed remarkable similarity to the correlates that clinicians
had reported from their clinical practice.

Moreover, statistical cross-

checks revealed that the observers saw each drawing characteristic as
occurring with one symptom more than others, that the observers agreed
on which symptom was with which characteristic, and that the correlates
reported were not actually present in the test data.
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In order to get at the associative basis of this illusory
correlation, the Chapmans distributed a questionnaire to subjects who did
not participate in the first task.

The purpose of this questionnaire was

to measure the associative strength between the problem area and the
parts of the body referred to in various drawing characteristics.

Each

of the six problem areas was paired with seven body parts, giving 42 pairings
in all.

The format of the questionnaire ran as follows:

SUSPICIOUSNESS to call to mind HEAD is •

"The tendency of

(a) very strong, (b) strong,

(c) moderate, (d) slight, (e) very slight, (f) no tendency at all."

The

responses from (a) to (f) were assigned values from six to one respectively.
The results were congruent with the earl.ier Chapman (1967) study; namely,
the strongest associative connections were between signs and symptoms of
the most often reported

j

JJ u.sory correlA.tions.

In the other five studies of the series on the DAP, the Chapmans
repeated the task to the same observers on three consecutive days,
presented the symptom statements without the accompanying drawings to
determine amount of prior expectation,

introdu~ed

negative correlations,

and attempted to maximize the motivation of the observers.
correla~ion

The illusory

phenomenon showed great resistance and was not markedly

affected by these procedures.
The Chapmans (1969) also applied the illusory correlation or
systematic error phenomenon to Rorschach content analysis.

They selected

erroneous signs (those which the literature failed to support), valid
signs (those which the literature did support), and essentially neutral
signs from Wheeler's :(!O signs of homosexuality.

They again surveyed
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practicing clinicians, determined the word associative strength of the
sign and symptom pairs, and generally found the reports of clinicians
and undergraduate observers to agree.

Moreover, both clinicians and

observers preferred invalid signs to valid signs in reporting illusory
correlates on the invalid signs.

Their 13 conditions with almost 700

judges repeatedly verified the presence of illusory correlation, and further
testified to its hardiness.
Starr and Katkin (1969) investigated the phenomenon of illusory
correlation using.Rotter's Incomplete Sentences Blank (ISB).

They surveyed

practicing clinicians to determine what responses these clinicians had
observed with particular personality characteristics.

They then presented

to clinical graduate students, non-clinical graduate students, and undergraduate students ISB sentence stems and completions with paired statements
from a pool of five problem statements;

Only five subjects (of 60)

correctly maintained that there was no relationship between the sentence
completions and the problem statements, and thus were not susceptible to
the illusory correlation.

Moreover, the reported correlates were quite

similar to those reported by the clinicians in the survey.
Golding and Rorer (1972) investigated illusory correlation with
Rorschach responses.

They chose Chapman and Chapman's (1969) paradigm

using valid and invalid signs of homosexuality.
determined the
to

~e

~

Golding and Rorer

priori expectations of undergraduate judges for a cue

associated with a particular symptom,

an~

then tested two types of

feedback conditions -- simultaneous and predictive.

Simultaneous feedback
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occurred when the statements appeared on the cards with the pictures as
in the Chapmans' designs (1967, 1969).

In this feedback condition,

the subjects were able to study the cue and symptom simultaneously on
each trial.

rn·prediction feedback, each subject was given a cue and was

required to predict the symptom before he was allowed to see the true value
of the symptom.

This training resulted in a decrease in the report of

illusory correlation.

Nevertheless, the reports of illusory correlation

were still far greater than chance.

Nor were there any differential effects

between the types of feedback given.
The Chapmans have noted that their findings of illusory correlation
as reported by clinicians do not in themselves give evidence of personality
qualities leading to deficits of judgment, but that they do clearly point
out some of the difficulties inherent in the clinician's task.

Golding

and Rorer, did find consistent and strong differences among subjects in the
nature of their response behavior.

Subjects significantly differed from

one another in the probabilities that they assigned to cue-symptom
relationships as well as in their response to the conditions of training
which were aimed at eliminating the report of illusory correlation.

Fiske

(1971) has noted that human judgment has deficiencies and that these
deficiencies must be assessed to determine generalizability over judges,
situations, and conditions.

Therefore, it seems a wise course to pursue

the illusory correlation phenomenon of the Chapmans to see if this error
is indeed generalizable to all judges or whether judges highly susceptible
to the error and who make unwarranted associations of sign and symptom
present personality characteristics which reliably differ from judges who
are not as susceptible to systematic error.
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Personality Correlates of Interest
The amount of research on personality characteristics of the clinical
judge is not impressive in sheer volume.

Literature specific to the charac-

teristics involved in the reading of the cues and to the association of
cues with symptoms of pathognomicity is even more noticeably lacking.

Most

of the studies which are available consider the ju_dgmental process of the
clinician on a more global scale and thus report more global personality
characteristics of various qualities of judges.

Adams (1927) and Vernon

(1933) distinguished the good judge of others and the good judge of self.
However, their reported characteristics did not include measures of specific
abilities.
vestigations
clinician.

Kelly and Fiske {1951) performed one of the more extensive inof the abilities and personality characteristics of the
However, here again, the correlation of specific traits with

the personality of the good judge were not remarkably high.

Nor did Kelly

and Fiske present measures which would address the specific ability to
respond to valid or invalid cues.
Thus, it may be necessary to look at c_ogni ti ve processes and to infer
the possible influence of these processes on clinical judgment.
be considered are field dependence and field independence.

First to

In considering

whether a judge responds to a present relationship between cue and symptom,
or whether or not he selects relevant cues, the ability to detect the cue
in the stimulus complex would seem to be of prime importance.

Witkin (1962)

has demonstrated that people differ in cognitive style and that they have
characteristic, self-consistent ways of functioning in their perceptual
and intellectual activities.

He has demonstrated that some people have an

ability to analyze a complex configuration and to respond to
parts of it, ignoring other parts.

specif~c

To these people he attributes the trait
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of field independence.

Conversely, people who have difficulty eliciting

a specified part from the whole complex are labeled field dependent.

.

Witkin and later researchers have also found particular personality
characteristics to be associated with each of these types of cognitive
styles.

Field dependent persons have been found to be in need of more

support and guidance from others.

They are thus particularly attentive

to facial characteristics and expressions which provide cues to other
people's attitudes and moods.

Field dependent persons characterize them-

selves and others in terms of "external" attributes.

Messick and Damarin

(1964) found field dependent people to have a better incidental recall of
photographs and to be relatively better
seen only briefly before.

~t

recognizing people they have

Field independent

per~ons,

however, are better

at incidental recall of jtems given in a stimulus complex.
If, as the Chapmans and others have suggested, reporters of illusory
correlations or utilizers of invalid cues are relying on prior expectations,
perhaps they are doing so because of an inability to select some part from
the complex stimulus configuration of the projective test protocol.

Field

dependent persons should more readily form proper cue-symptom relationships
because of their attentiveness to expressed affective cues of others.
ever, it may be that their global handling of the affective cues
with their observation of frequency of

cue~symptom

pairings.

How-

int~rferes

Thus, one

might hypothesize that those more susceptible to the systematic error of
word association of sign and symptom are more field dependent than are
those who are not as susceptible and who are thus free to see cues and their
symptoms in proper relationships.

15

A second variable to be considered is creativity.

In their book

on creative thinking, Wallach and Kogan (1965) considered Guilford's (1967)
mode of divergent thinking.

Divergent thil}king can roughly be described

as thinking in different directions, and as searching for variety.

Considered

within this domain are the cognitive units of originality, expressional
fluency, ideational fluency, word fluency, and associational fluency.

One

aspect of the capacity to generate these cognitive units is the limit of
a person's behavioral repertoire of cognitive productions.

Thus, Wallach

and Kogan define creativity as the capacity to store cognitive elements.
Mednick (1962) differentiated two variables which reflect individual
differences in creativity.

First of all,. there is the total number of

associations of which a person is capable; and secondly, is the relative
tmiqui:>n~ss

that his associations possess.

Gradients of abl:>uciative

response strength are different for high and low creative persons, and
these gradient slopes represent the emission potential of the person.

To

use Mednick's example, if the word "table" is presented, the highly stereotypic response would be "chair."

The stereotypic responses are high in a

person's hierarchy, while the unique associates are lower in the hierarchy.
The sharply-sloped gradient of available responses which defines the less
creative person contains the responses of greatest stereotypy.

The shallow-

sloped gradient of available responses which defines the more creative
person represents a larger number of available cognitive elements.

Thus,

a person who can be represented by the shallow gradient will most likely
offer stereotyped associates to begin with, just as the person operating
under the sharp gradient.

However, when the less creative person (repre-
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sented by the sharp slope) exhausts his repertoire of responses, the more
creative person (represented by the shallow slope) will continue responding
with increasingly unique associates.

Thus, the word association behavior

of the highly creative individual should be characterized by less stereotypy
and commonality.
The Chapmans (Chapman, 1967; Chapman & Chapman, 1967) have presented strong evidence testifying that one basis of illusory correlation
is the word association between symptom and cue.

The most oft-reported

illusory correlates are those with the strongest cue-symptom word association.
Thus, one might suspect that those persons most susceptible to the illusory
correlation phenomenon

~re

less creative than those who are less susceptible

to the illusory correlation.
Another variable to be considered is social intelligence.

The ability

to read and to react to affective cues from another person and to respond
with appropriate affect is the essence of the ability termed social insight,
or social intelligence (Guilford, 1967; Thorndike, 1920b).

This ability

appears to be closely related to the cognitive processes of creativity in
that both are prominent correlates of sensitivity to physiognomic properties.
These physiognomic properties are those of a cue presentation which provide
information about the affective or emotional significance (sadness, fear,
weakness, etc.) of such stimuli.

Reading the stimulus cues to detect

physiognomic properties requires the positing of a symbol-referent relation
between a visual pattern and an emotional state.
configuration signifies a particular affect.

Thus, a particular visual

The ability to posit such
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a relationship between cue and affect is the product of a learned inference,
and it thus varies from person to person.

Creativity and social intelligence

differ in that creativity refers to the capacity for production of relationships between visual patterns and emotional states, while social intelligence
refers to the ability to understand the social consequences of patternstate relationships· and to then produce behaviors acting in accordance with
such an understanding.

The judge high in

so~ial

intelligence possesses more

of the ability to detect the social consequences and affective tone of a
cue configuration.

Consequently, when attempting to infer personality

characteristics from the cues presented. on a test protocol, the person
with greater social intelligence should make more valid associations of
cue and symptom.

In addition, if such a person is more readily aware of

the social consequences, one might suppose that he is more aware of external
cues as well.

Thus, one might suspect that a person high in social

intelligence is likewise aware of frequency of cues and that he therefore
would be less susceptible to the illusory correlation phenomenon.
A fourth personality-related dimension which might properly be
considered is the confidence with which a judge designates a cue or set of
cues to be indicative of a symptom.

This confidence should reflect the

degree to which that association is learned (Hunt & Jones, 1961).

If the

Chapmans are correct that illusory correlation is a learned verbal
association and that such a learned verbal association represents greater
stereotypy, then one would expect in this instance that the judges who
report invalid signs would express more confidence in their choices.
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A fifth consideration is that the number of cues utilized may be
related to success.

Wescott (1968), in studying intuitive problem solving

with his Test of Intuitive Problem Solving! failed to find a positive
correlation between success and number of cues utilized.

Hunt and Walker

(1971) did find success and number of cues to be positively related.

Westcott

noted that some subjects apparently possessed the ability and did extract
more information than did others.

His findings did indicate that the

probability of success increased with additional information.

If reporters

of illusory correlations are reporting stereotypic learned relationships,
then it can be expected that they would utilize a lesser number of cues
in making a judgmental inference.
Choosing an Experimental Paradigm
Determining the

personalit~l

characteristics and ab:i.lit:tes of the

highly error-prone judge and less error-prone judge requires a controlled
situation in which all judges are reviewing the same test stimuli with
the same amount of background information.

In order to simulate a

clinical situation in which judges review test stimuli and then must make
a decision about the personality of the patient, the paradigm used by the
Chapmans will be employed.

Goldberg's (1968) acclamation of the Chapmans'

studies as "one of the most ingenious studies of clinical judgment ever
made" certainly singles out their methodology for consideration.
If one attempts to replicate the Chapmans' discovery of illusory
correlations in clinical observations, there is a choice between their
design on the DAP or their design on the Rorschach.

While the Rorschach

design offers the advantage of differentiating valid and invalid signs,
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the DAP more closely resembles a judgmental situation involving clinical
inference based on subjective associations of cues and symptoms.
essential elements of investigation are
the judges or observers.

th~

The

personality characteristics of

The DAP will suffice to differentiate those

judges who report illusory correlations {cue-symptom relationships which
are not present) of a highly stereotypic, associative nature, and those
judges who report relationships of a less associative nature.

The former

judges will be designated as those highly susceptible to the illusory
correlation phenomenon, while the latter judges will be designated as those
less susceptible to illusory correlation.
The hypotheses to be tested are that judges who are highly susceptible
to illusory correlation:

1) are more field dependent, 2) score lower on

tests of creativity, 3) score lower on tests of social intE:!lllgern.:e, 4) a:r:e
more confident in their choice of cues, and 5) utilize a lesser number of
cues than judges who are less susceptible to illusory correlation.

CHAPTER II
Method
Subjects
Ninety-two male undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology
course at Loyola University served as subjects.

They were questioned for

previous experience with the DAP, but no subjects reported any prior
experience with this instrument.

Twenty-two subjects participated in

Experiment I, the reliability design, but were not permitted to participate
in Experiment II, the personality correlates design.

Twenty-one of those

twenty-two subjects returned for the second testing.

Seventy subjects

participated in Experiment II and are henceforth referred to as judges.
Task Materials
The materials used and the procedure of stimulus administration
approximated those of the Chapmans as closely as possible.

The drawings

were, in fact, the same as those employed in the Chapman design,* which
were collected from ten nonpsychotics and 35 psychotics.

Xerox reproductions

were obtained of each drawing, and each drawing was backed by cardboard and
covered with clear plastic to protect it from the effects of handling.
Six symptom statements were used for pairing with the drawings.
The six symptom statements were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
*

He
He
He
He
He
He

is worried about how manly he is.
is suspicious of other people.
is worried about how intelligent he is.
is concerned with being fed and taken care of by other people.
has had problems of sexual impotence.
is worried that people are saying bad things about him.

The author would like to thank Loren Chapman for generously sharing his
stimulus drawings.
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Printed on the same sheet of paper as each drawing were a pair of
the above statements purporting to represent symptoms of the patient who
made the drawing.
were used.
cards.

All possible pairs (lS) of the six symptom statements

Each pairing appeared three times to make a total set of 45

Thus, each symptom statement appeared on 15 different cards.

In

order to prevent a relationship between the occurrence of each symptom
and any of the drawing characteristics expected (that is, any of the 14
drawing characteristics which the Chapmans obtained from their survey of
clinicians) , the Chapmans had had each drawing ranked according to the
presence of each characteristics.

Thus, assigning symptom statements to

drawings was done in such a way that no systematic relationship existed
between the occurrence of a symptom and any drawing characteristic.
This was accomplished by pairing the symptom statcmont equally often with
the drawings having each of various degrees of possession of the drawing
characteristic.

For example, the symptom statement, ''He is worried about

how intelligent he is." was paired as often with drawings having small
heads as with large or medium-sized heads.

This prevented any actual

correlation between cue and symptom.
Experiment .!_
Chapman and Chapman (1967} indicated that a group of judges reported
similar percentages of illusory correlates for the same cues in the repetition
of the task on three consecutive days.

Nevertheless, this did not clearly

establish that the same judges were reporting the same illusory correlates
on each of these three presentations.

To test the reliability of this

phenomenon for individual judges over successive administrations, Experiment I
was employed.
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Procedure
In Experiment I, twenty-two subjects were tested in a group setting.
The experimenter first presented a brief' description of the DAP and its
clinical use, explaining that psychologists make interpretations about
patients' emotional problems from the nature of their drawings,
amples of drawing

~haracteristics

No

ex~

were offered.

The following instructions were then given:
Now we want to test your powers of judgment and observation. I am
going to show you some drawings made by men with various emotional
problems. Together with each drawing you will find two statements
that describe the emotional problems of the man who made the drawing.
Many of the men have some of the same problems. Please study the
pictures and the statements carefu~ly because when you are through
I am going to ask you about the characteristics of the drawings that
were made by men with each kind of problem~
Each subject was handed a drawing f;::i.ce down.

At a signal, the

subjects looked at the card for 30 seconds and on signal passed the card
on, receiving a new card in the process.

This was repeated every 30

seconds until each of the subjects had seen each of the 45 drawings once.
After all the subjects had seen all of the 45 drawings, a questionnaire
was distributed to each subject with items of the following format:
Some of the pictures which
problem:
"He is worried
Did you notice any general
characterized the drawings
Yes
If your answer is yes, the
characterized by:

you saw were drawn by men with the following
about how manly he is."
kind of thing or things which most often
made by men with this problem?
No
pictures drawn by these men were more often

------
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A f?rmat like the above was constructed around each of the other five
symptom statements as well.
When all of the subjects had completed all six of the items, the
subjects were asked to list the amount of confidence they felt in making
the associations of signs and symptoms for each of the six statements on
a scale of:
(1) Guessed, (2) Rather uncertain, (3) Fairly certain, (4) Rather
certain, (5) Positive.
Two weeks later, the subjects were recalled.

Twenty-one subjects returned

and performed the same task with identical materials, instructions, and
procedure.
Experiment g
Tne ::;tudies on illusory correlation indicale that the phenomenon
is massively reported in nearly all conditions.

Very few judges

correctly indicate that there are no cue-symptom relationships present.
Since there are no valid cue-symptom relationships present, any reporting
of a relationship may be considered to be erroneous.

Evidence seems to

indicate that most judges are imbued with prior expectations of a cuesymptom relationship and that this prior expectation may be the cause of
the illusory phenomenon (Chapman & Chapman, 1967, 1969; Golding & Rorer,
1972).

In addition, the most popular illusory correlates are those of the

highest associative strength, and, thus, are those of greatest prior
expectation.

Evidence from these studies suggests that the most popular

illusory correlates are those which interfere with the reporting of valid
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cue~symptom

relationships.

Thus, those judges who report the most

popular illusory correlates may be identified as those highly susceptible
to illusory correlation, while those judges who report no relationships
or who do not report the most popular illusory correlates may be identified
as those less susceptible to illusory correlation.

The purpose of

Experiment II then, was to differentiate between those judges highly
susceptible to the illusory phenomenon and those judges less susceptible
to the illusory phenomenon, and to compare scores of these highly susceptible and less susceptible judges on personality-ability measures of
field dependence-independence, social intelligence, and creativity.
Procedure
In Experiment II the seventy subjects were tested in groups
varying in size from eight to seventeen.

The materials, instructions, and

procedure were the same as those of the task in Experiment I.

The most

commonly reported illusory correlations for each symptom statement in
both

Experiment~

I and II were compared with the most often reported

correlates given by surveyed clinicians published in

C~apman

and Chapman

(1967).
Utilizing the Chapmans' information as criteria, scoring standards
for two scales were formulated, one employing the most frequently reported
(most "popular") drawing characteristic for each symptom statement as
given by surveyed clinicians, and one employing the most popular responses
given by the Chapmans' experimental undergraduate subjects.

Thus, accord-

ing to each scale, the range of erroneous populars which an individual
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subject could report observing across the six symptom statements extended
from zero to six; that is, potentially one for each of the six symptom
statements,

Those judges who reported a· large number of illusory populars

(four, five, or six} were considered highly susceptible to the illusory
phenomenon, while those who reported no or few populars (zero, one, or two}
were considered to be less susceptible to the illusory phenomenon.

Since

the results of the personality measures are to be generalized to practicing
clinicians, more attention has been paid to the scale of the clinician
responses (hereafter referred to as the "Clinician Scale"} as opposed to
the scale of the student responses (hereafter referred to as the "Student
Scale"}.
Measures
Five tests representing three personality characteristics and
abilities were then group administered.

The characteristics and measures

are as follows:
a}

A test of field dependence, the Hidden Figures Test (HFT,
Cf-1} (Witkin et al., 1962) was used to determine scores on
a continuum of field dependence-independence.

The HFT, Cf-1

resembles the Witkin Embedded Figures Test in that it
measures the ability to recognize a figure hidden among
other lines.
b)

Two of Wallach and Kogan's (1965) creativity tests were
utilized to determine level of creativity.

Two items of

Alternate Uses ("cork," "chair") and two items of Similarities
were employed ("watch-typewriter," "curtain-rug").

26
c)

Two of Guilford's tests (O'Sullivan & Guilford, 1966),
Cartoon Predictions and Expression Grouping, were used to
measure social intelligence or the ability to draw implications from social relationships.

Two additional scores obtained from an analysis of responses on
the experimental ta?k were:
d)

Level of Confidence was determined from the judges' subjective
report as obtained from the confidence rating scale.

e)

Average Number of Cues Utilized was determined by counting
and averaging the number of signs reported by each subject
for each symptom statement.

CHAPTER III

Results
Experiment

.!

The results of the test-retest reliability design are presented
'

in Table 1 for the twenty-one subjects who completed both

tas~s.

The

results are given according to the Clinician Scale and according to the
Student Scale.

(Each of these Scales was scored on first and second

testing according to the number of popular responses reported, with a
possible range of zero to six.)

A test-retest correlation of 0.65 was

obtained for the Clinician Scale (most frequently presented clinician
responses) using the Pearson product-moment.

A test-retest correlation

of 0.70 was obtained for the comparable Student Scale (most frequently
presented student responses) .

Table l also indicates the percentage 0f

individual responses which were repeated on the second testing.

For

example, if the characteristic "head emphasis" was reported for the
symptom statement "He is worried about his intelligence," on both test
and retest, this was scored as a repetition.

Seventy-five percent of

such popular responses were repeated by subjects on second testing
utilizing the Clinician Scale, while 72% of the popular responses were
repeated by the subjects on second testing utilizing the Student Scale.
This can be compared to the 56% of first responses, popular and non-popular,
repeated on second testing for all the subjects.
Additional data from the test-retest design revealed that the
average number of responses given for each symptom statement on first
testing was 1.24, while a comparable average of 1.27 responses was given
27
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Table 1
Reliability Coefficients and Percentages of
Popular and Total Responses Repeated on Both Testings

Clinician Scale a
Reliability b
(Number of Popular Responses)
Percentage of Popular Responses
Repeated on Both Testings

Student Scale a

.70

.65
75%

Percentage of Total Responses
Repeated on Both Testings

72%

56%

a

Formulated from Chapman and Chapman (1967) data.

b

Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient.

29

for each symptom statement on second testi_ng.

The average confidence

level per response on first testing was 3.60, while the figure for
second testing was slightly less at 3.53:

The average number of "No

Relationship" responses.per subject of first testing was 1.14; on
second testing, 1.00 "No Relationship" responses were reported by each
subject.
Experiment II -- Scale comparisons
The responses of the 70 questionnaires of Experiment II are given
in Table 2.

The results are presented in terms of percentage of subjects

who reported each characteristic across the symptom statements.
most frequently reported characteristics are presented.

In addition, the

percentage of subjects reporting "No Relationship" is also given.

Q

a..~alyses

Only the

Cochran

were computed for each of the descriptive statements to deter-

mine if the response characteristics were randomly distributed among the
respective symptom statements.

The distribution of characteristics across

each symptom statement was found to be non-random for five of the statements (p< .01 in each case).

These results show that the judges saw one

or more drawing characteristic as occurring with a statement more often
than any other characteristic.
A comparison of Table 2 with the Chapmans' data (Table 1, page 196,
Chapman & Chapman, 1967) shows that the same characteristics tended to be
reported for the six statements in both studies.

One of the Chapmans'

fifteen characteristics, "phallic limbs," was not reported by the judges

Table 2
Percent of Subjects Reporting Each Characteristic According to Symptoms (n=70)
Characteristic

1. Manliness

l. Manly, muscular
broad shoulders
2. Feminine, childlike
3. Detailed drawing
4. Eyes atypical
5. Ears atypical
6. Facial expression
atypical
7. Head emphasized
8. Mouth emphasized
9. Passive posture
outstretched arms
10. Sexual area
11. Clothing
12 . Arms , hands
13. Profile
No Relationship
a
Cochran Q

2. Suspicious

3. Intelligence

Fed and
4. Cared for

68

5. Impotence

Say bad
6. things

15

32

39
12
42
18

20
14
20
53

15

31

8
w

18
16

59
15

4
36.09b

0

15
15

15

15
8

10

18

10

14.00b

24.50b

11.02b

43.57b

25
5.60

a

Cochran Q method was utilized with the three characteristics ("No relationship" responses not included)
most frequently reported for each of the symptom statements. The Q value represents the probability
that the frequencies of the responses differ from random distribution. If the observed Q value is
equal to or greater than the critical value (for p < .01), the implication is that the frequencies of
the reported characteristics differ significantly among themselves.

b

p <

~01
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in the present experiment.

In addition, the characteristics, "sexual

area emphasized" and "sexual area deemphasized" have been combined into
one category "sexual area" due to the difficulty in clearly differentiating judges'· responses into two categories of a sexual nature.
Table 3 combines summaries of the Chapmans' results and the
sults of the present study.

re~

A comparison is made between the reports of

the Chapmans' surveyed clinicians, the reports of the Chapmanst experimental subjects, and reports of the present experimental judges,

Only

the three characteristics most frequently reported for each sta.tement
by judges in each of the above three. groups have been· included.

One can

see a high amount of congruity between the reports of the Chapmans'
students and the reports of the present student judges.

This s:uggests

experimental reliability in both the Chapmans 1 and the present design.
Also, once again, there is substantial congruity between the reports of
surveyed clinicians and the reports of undergraduate students.· Utilizing
the most frequently reported response for each of the six statements, these
responses were summed to get scores for both the Clinician Scale and the
Student Scale.

In other words, the reports of the 70 judges were

com~

pared 1n terms of scoring on the Clinician Scale and scoring on the Student
Scale.

A correlation of 0.79 was obtained between these two scorings with

the Pearson product-moment.

This suggests high but not complete agreement

between clinicians and student judges.

Inspection of Tables 2 and 3

indicates that results from four of the six statements (Numbers 1, 2, 3, and
5) are more congruent between clinicians and students than are results from

-··

"
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Table 3
Comparison of Percentages of Characteristics
Reported by Chapmans' Clinicians and Students
and Present Experimental Group
Groups
Characteristic

Clinicians a
n = 44

Students a
n = 108

Experimental Group
n

=

1. Manliness
1. Muscular manly
2. Feminine, childlike
3. Sexual area
No Relationshipb

80
23

1. Eyes atypical
2. Ears atypical
3. F'acial expression atypical
No Relationship

91
55
18

1. Head large or emphasized
2. Facial expression
3. Detail
No Relationship

82

14

76
22
5

68
32
16
4

2. Suspicious
58
6

42
6

44

18
8

3. Intelligence
2
34

55
21

13

53

20
12
10

4. Fed and Cared for
1. Mouth emphasized
2. Feminine, childlike
3. Passive posture
No Relationship

68
32

1. Sexual area
2. Manly, muscular
3. Feminine, childlike
No Relationship

73

35

25
23

31
25

1. Ears atypical
2. Facial expression atypical
3. Eyes atypical
No Relationship

64

36

8

8

39
21

39

18
18

5. Impotence

a
b

59
15
8

10

18
43

6. Say bad things
7
52
26

14
31
20
25

From Chapman and Chapman (1967).
The Chapmans' data did not include a "No Relationship" response.

70

33
the other two statements (Numbers 4 and 6).

This is suggested by

agreement between clinicians and students on the most popular response

.

on these four statements as well as highly significant Cochran Q values,
and finally by the tendency of experimental judges to give fewer "No
Relationship" responses on these four

statemen~s.

In contrast, for the

two weakest measures of illusory correlation, Statements 4 and 6,
respectively 18% and 26% of the judges reported observing "No Relationship."
While the Cochran Q value was significant at the .01 level for Statement 4,
no characteristic was reported by more than 39% of the judges.
Experiment _!.!. -- Personality measures
Utilizing the Clinician Scale (i.e., the characteristic most
frequently reported by clinical psychologists for each of the six
statements) the number of illusory populars was computed for each
subject on a potential scale of zero to six.

The top horizontal columns

of Tables 4 and 5 categorize the 70 judges according to the number of
populars they gave.
two.

The modal number of illusory populars reported was

No reports of six illusory populars were obtained in Experiment II.

A look at the distribution of reported illusory populars over the Clinician
Scale suggests a positively skewed distribution of responses.

In addition,

in Tables 4 and 5, the mean scores and standard deviations of five personality-ability measures and two measures derived from the experimental task
are given for the different values on the Clinician Scale.

two reported populars) and high (three, four, five, or
populars) reporters of illusory correlation.

This divisio
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Table 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and t-Scores of
Selected Measures for
Low and High Reporters of Illusory Populars

Low

Measure

n = 39
0-2 Populars Reported

High
= 31
3-6 Populars Reported
n

t

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

1. Hidden Figures Test

11.14

6.24

12.21

6.51

0.70

2. Expression Grouping

18.87

2.47

19.50

2.49

1.06

3. Cartoon Predictions

23.44

2.37

23.'38

1.90

1.00

4. Similarities

12.95

5.21

13.32

4.37

0.31

5. Alternate Uses

14.10

5.41

16.42

5.42

l.78a

6. Average Number of
Responses Per
Item

1.42

0.56

1. 70

0.62

a
1.99

7. Average Confidence
Per Response

3.21

0.60

3.36

0.46

1.11

a

p < .1
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distribution of reported populars gives 39 low reporters versus 31
high reporters.

The means and standard deviations for each of the five

personality measures and the two task-derived measures are given, and
differences in the means of these measures between low and high reporters
are compared using Student's t-test.

Two measures, Alternate ·uses and

Average Number of Responses Per Item, were found to appr9ach significance
at the 0.10 level (two-tailed), suggesting a trend for each of these
measures.

No other significant differences in means were found.

The same results are rearranged and presented in Table 5 according
to four categories of reported populars {zero-one, two, three, four-six).
As Table 5 indicates, categories zero and one, as well as four, five,
and six have been combined due to the low frequencies of reports.

Once

again, the means and standard deviations of the five personality measures
and the two task-derived measures are given.

A one-tailed F-test was used

to test for significant differences in means of personality measures
across number of reported illusory populars, with a Newman-Keuls analysis
(unequal n correction) of the differences between all
of means.

p~ssible

comparisons

Table 6 presents the F values of these comparisons for the seven

dependent measures.

For Expression Grouping, a measure of social

intelligence, significant differences were obtained between the means
of zero-one and two reported illusory populars {p < .005), zero-one and
four-six reported illusory populars {p < .005), and zero-one and three
reported illusory populars (p < .025). A significant difference (p < .05)

Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Measures According to
Number of·Illusory Populars Reported

Measure

0-1
n = 13
Mean
SD

Number of Illusori PoEulars Re~rted
2
4-6
3
n = 26
n = 13
n = 18
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
Mean
SD

·---

1.

Hidden Figures Test

11.03

5.95

11.20

7.04

13.32

6.78

10.68

6.04

2.

Expression Grouping

16.92

2.83

19.85

2.47

19.36

2.37

19.69

2.56

3.

Cartoon Predictions

23.05

1.51

23.64

2.63

23.91

1.90

24.05

1.95

4.

Alternate Uses

14.69

5.45

13.81

4.74

16.44

5.71

16.38

4.31

5.

Similarities

6.
7.

12.15

4.00

13.35

S..17

13.83

4.03

12.62

5.51

Average Number of
Responses Per Item

1.38

.47

1.44

.60

1.54

.so

1.92

.68

Average Confidence
Per Response

3.34

.44

3.15

.66

3.34

.38

3.38

.60

w

°'
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Table 6
F-Values

a

for the Difference Between Means of Selected Measures

According to Number of Illusory Populars Reported

Mean Comparisons of
Categories of Illusory Populars Reported

Measure

0-1

0-1

0-1

2

2

3

to

to

to

to

to

to

2

3

4-6

3

4-6

4-6

2.29

.35

2.12

.54

2.64

2. 77

.49

.16

.33

1.

Hidden Figures Test

.17

2.

Expression Grouping

2.93

3.

Cartoon Predictions

.59

.86

1.00

.27

.41

.14

4.

Alternate Uses

.88

1. 75

1.69

2.63

2.57

.06

5.

Similarities

1.20

1.68

.47

.48

.73

1.21

6.

Average Number of
Responses Per Item

.06

.16

.54

.10

.48

.38

Average Confidence
Per Response

.19

.oo

.04

.19

.23

.04

7.

a
b

c
d

'Newman-Keuls analysis (unequal n's)
p < .005
p < .025
p < .05

b

2.44

c

b

d
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was also found between the means of Average Number of Responses Per Item
for zero-one reported illusory populars and four-six reported illusory
populars.

No other differences were significant.

The results of Experiment II were further analyzed to determine
whether a relationship existed between scores on each of the five
personality measures and the number of "No Relationship" responses
reported by the experimental judges.

Table 7 presents the mean number

of "No Relationship" responses for high and low scores (median split)
on each of the five personality measures, and the corresponding
t-values.

None of the differences were significant.
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Table 7
Mean Number of "No Relationship" Responses Reported for
High and Low Scorers on Selected Personality Measures

Mean Number of "No
Relationshi:e" ResEonses
Low Scorers

Measure

n = 35

a

High Scorers
n =.35

a
t

1.

Hidden Pigures 'l'est

• 77

.66

.55

2.

Expression Grouping

.83

.60

.99

3.

Cartoon Predictions

.66

• 77

.55

4.

Alternate Uses

.so

.63

.82

5.

Similarities

.83

.60

1.10

a

Median split.

CHAPTER IV
Discussion
The results of the present study replicate and add validity to the
data of Chapman· and Chapman (1967).

A high amount of congruity can be

observed between the results of the present design and the results
presented for the Chapmans' student subjects.

Furthermore, the reports

of the present 70 student judges are once again in high agreement with
the reports of the Chapmans' surveyed clinicians.

A relatively high

correlation (.79). between clinicians' and students' reports was obtained
by further investigating the present data with the construction of a
Clinician Scale and a Student Scale of the most frequently reported
characteristics.

Thus, the evidence of the present study adds further

support to the illusory correlation hypothesis offered by the Chapmans
that many clinical interpretations of projective test material have their
origins in illusory correlations based on naively and intuitively formed
associative connections.
The test-retest correlations suggest that the report of an illusory
relationship is a relatively stable phenomenon.

Reliability coefficients

of .65 (Clinician Scale) and .70 (Student Scale) were obtained for the
most popular illusory responses.

As the data in Table 1 suggest, the

illusory popular is more reliably reported than are nonpopular reports
of relationships.

According to Clinician-Scale scoring and Student-

Scale scoring, respectively, 75% and 72% of the popular responses
reported on first administration were again reported by individual
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subjects on a second administration of the DAP materials.

For the total

responses, including both popular and nonpopular responses, only 56% of
first responses were again reported on second testing.

This difference in

stability of report £or popular responses and total responses encourages
the explanation that the symptom-characteristic associative relationship
of an illusory popular is stronger than the symptom-characteristic associative relationship of a nonpopular report.

In addition, there is evidence

that the associative strength of characteristic to symptom differentially
varies for each of the six symptom statements.
characteristic-symptom populars have
characteristic-symptom populars.

st~onger

For example,

This suggests that some
associations than other
~e

illusory populars

"head-intell:i.gence" and "sexual area-impotence" were reported by a
greater percentage of the subjects than were the populars "mouth-fed and cared
for" or "eyes-suspicious."

Likewise, there was less tendency to give a

"No Relationship" response for the symptom-characteristics of greatest
associative strength.
The most interesting finding regarding personality-ability measures
was the marked lack of significant differences between high and low
reporters of illusory correlation.

As the information on Table 4 suggests,

the high-low dichotomy yielded only trend differences for two measures,
Alternate Uses and Average Number of Responses per Item.

In addition,

these trend indications were opposite to those offered in the original
hypotheses; namely, it was hypothesized that low reporters of illusory
correlation would score higher on these variables than would high reporters
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of illusory correlation.

Since Alternate Uses, as a measure of creative

productivity, is related in concept to Average Number of Responses per
Item, what the data seem to suggest, then, is that high reporters of
illusory correlation tend to see a greater number of characteristicsymptom relationships in the stimulus material, or, generalizing to the
clinician's task, in projective test protocols.
Since a high-low dichotomy may include curvilinear data and thus
shield true differences, an extended analysis of the number of reported
illusory populars and personality measures was performed.
sent this information.

Here, the

numbe~

Tables 5 and 6 pre-

of reported populars were grouped

into four categories -- zero-one, two, three, and four-six reported populars.

Only one personality-ability variable, Exp:r.P.ssion Gr.oupi.ng, whi.ch

is a measure of social intelligence, was found to differ significantly
across the number of illusory populars reported.

Those who reported zero

or one popular significantly differed from those reporting two populars
(p < .005), three populars (p < .025), and four, five, or six populars
(p < .005).

Once again, the original hypothesis that high reporters would

be more stereotypic and less socially sensitive to cues, and thus less
socially intelligent was contradicted.

According to the present evidence,

the opposite situation may be suggested; namely, that those judges who report
few illusory populars (zero-one) manifest less social intelligence than
judges highly susceptible to the illusory phenomenon.

A recent article

(Ke'lley, 1973) discussing the Chapmans' illusory phenomenon within the
realm of attribution theory and implicit personality theory lends some
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support to this suggestion.

If the learned associative basis of the

illusory correlation phenomenon is a result of experience stored as an
implicit cognitive organization, then perhaps the stronger and more abundant
the associative cue relationships, the greater the amount of social
intelligence, which is also sometimes thought to be dependent on relatively
covert cues.
Tables 5 and 6 also indicate a trend difference in Average Number
of Responses per Item.

As noted and discussed above, the original hypothesis

was not supported; the opposite situation was suggested in that high
reporters of illusory populars gave
of illusory populars.

mor~

responses than did low reporters

In utilizing a technique.of self-report other.

than an opi:m-ended questionnaire, one might be able to discern whet.lier t.l-ie
number of populars reported is merely a function of increased responses,
or whether, as the present evidence suggests, is indeed dependent upon
differential associative response strengths.

For example, with a multiple-

choice, one-response-per-item format on the questionnaire the number of
responses would be the same for all subjects.

The probability of reporting

an illusory correlation would not be inflated by the opportunity to give
more associations.

If results similar to the present results were obtained,

one could assert with more certainty that the probability of reporting an
illusory correlation depends upon the associative strength of the characteristic and symptom.
Inherent in the definition of illusory correlation is the
assumption that judges who report "No Relationship" do not see a characteristic-symptom relationship in the material and thus are not susceptible
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to the illusory phenomenon.

This implies that judges who give a large

number of "No Relationship" responses should present more of the positive
qualities associated with the personality-ability measures.

However, the

results presented in Table 7 do not support such an hypothesis.

No

significant differences are evident between high and low scorers on these
personality-ability measures and the number of "No Relationship" responses
given.
The variation in associative strengths of the illusory popular
characteristics for each of their respective symptom statements (collectively
identified as the Clinician Scale or the Student Scale) suggests that
Number of Reported Populars may not represent an homogenous index of
measurement.

If this is indeed the case, the negative findings of the

majority of the personality measures may not be a correct representation
of the true case.

In order to correct for this, in future research

utilizing Number of Reported Populars on a DAP task such as the one
employed here, it is recommended that only the four strongest of the six
symptom statements be utilized.

In addition, experimentation might be

undertaken to arrange a method of more objective scoring such as a multiple
selection technique rather than an open-ended questionnaire.
Future research might also examine the relationship between the
operational definitions offered by the Chapmans on the DAP, on the
Rorschach, and by Starr and Katkin (1969) on the Incomplete Sentences
Blank.

It is recormnended that the investigation of the illusory correlation

phenomenon be extended to other clinical interpretative tasks such as the
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Thematic Apperception Test {and other TAT-type tests}, to qualitative
interpretations of WAIS responses, and to interview material itself.
Finally, it seems more research is needed like that of Golding
and Rorer '(1972}' in investigating the resistance of illusory correlation
to corrective training attempts.

Contrary to the expectations of this

study, the present results add little new information on the important
question of the personality characteristics of the effective clinician.
The answer may lie more in training than in personality differences.
Perhaps good clinicians are made, not born.

Summary
This study has investigated the relationship of various personalityability measures (field dependence, creativity, and social intelligence)
and the phenomenon of illusory correlation in the context of clinical
judgment.

Chapman and Chapman (1967, 1969) have defined and investigated

illusory correlation in the clinical judgment of projective test protocols.
Illusory correlation has been defined as the tendency to report characteristic-symptom relationships in diagnostic material which in fact do not
exist in that material or which exist to a lesser extent than that reported.
The report of an illusory correlation is thought to depend upon the
characteristics of the stimulus materiai and upon the perceptive qualities
of the judge.
The present study attempted to differentiate judges according to
the nwnber of illusory correlates they reported -- that is, judges highly
susceptible to the illusory phenomenon and judges less susceptible to the
illusory phenomenon

and to see if high and low reporters of this

phenomenon differed on five personality-ability measures and two taskderived measures.

It was hypothesized that low reporters of this

illusory phenomenon would score higher on these personality measures than
would high reporters of illusory correlation.
DAP drawings were viewed by 70 undergraduate, male subjects who
were then divided into groups on the basis of the nwnber of times they
reported the illusory phenomenon in a subsequent questionnaire.
subjects were then given the following measures:

These

Hidden Figures Test

(field dependence), Expression Grouping and Cartoon Predictions (social
46
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intelligence), and Alternate Uses and Similarities (creativity).

The

amount of confidence with which a judge gave a response (Average Confidence
Per Response) and the nwnber of responses given for each symptom statement
(Average Nwnber of Responses Per Item) were determined from responses on
the questionnaires.
The original hypotheses were not supported.

Trend indications

in the direction opposite to that hypothesized were found for Alternate
Uses (creative productivity) and Average Nwnber of Responses Per Item.
No other differences were significant.

Further investigation revealed

significant differences between the scores of infrequent reporters and
more frequent reporters (p < .005, p < .025; both one-tailed) for
Expression Grouping, a measure of social intelligence.

Once again,

Average Number of Responses Per Item was the only other measure with at
least a trend indication.

The stability of reports of the illusory

phenomenon was also determined.

With test-retest reliabilities of 0.65 and

0.70 having been obtained for two different methods of scoring.

Implications

of these essentially negative results were discussed, and it was suggested
that training rather than personality differences may be of more importance
in determining whether judges are susceptible to illusory correlation.
Suggestions were also made for future research, including the development
of other methods of self-report in the questionnaire, the investigation
of illusory correlation on other diagnostic tasks, and the synthesis of
present operational definitions of illusory correlation.
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